Illness and femininity in Hilary Mantel’s Giving Up the Ghost (2003) by Vickers, Neil
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/0950236X.2017.1371221
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Vickers, N. (2017). Illness and femininity in Hilary Mantel’s Giving Up the Ghost (2003). TEXTUAL PRACTICE,
1-23. DOI: 10.1080/0950236X.2017.1371221
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rtpr20
Download by: [King's College London] Date: 29 September 2017, At: 08:41
Textual Practice
ISSN: 0950-236X (Print) 1470-1308 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtpr20
Illness and femininity in Hilary Mantel’s Giving Up
the Ghost (2003)
Neil Vickers
To cite this article: Neil Vickers (2017): Illness and femininity in Hilary Mantel’s Giving Up the
Ghost (2003), Textual Practice, DOI: 10.1080/0950236X.2017.1371221
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0950236X.2017.1371221
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 08 Sep 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 62
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Illness and femininity in Hilary Mantel’s Giving Up the
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Department of English Literature, King’s College London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper offers a reading of Hilary Mantel’s memoir, Giving Up The Ghost (2003).
The interest of the memoir derives from the fact that it provides an exceptionally
rich picture of the impact of family life on a child’s attitudes towards her own
body. Mantel presents her bodily experiences as primitive, often unconscious,
perceptions of the relationships within her family of origin. When she
discovers new things about those relationships, she must register the change
through her body in some way. Drawing on a range of concepts taken from
psychoanalytic psychosomatics, I suggest that at the heart of the memoir is
the author’s bafflement at the repeated and uncanny irruption of a conflict
between her body as a somewhat autonomous signifying entity and the
psychological strength she seeks and often finds through identifications with
family members. I argue that this conflict overlapped with her acceptance of a
female gender identity. The sustained nature of this conflict prevented her
from establishing a metric of what I will call ‘psychosomatic normality’, with
disastrous consequences when she began to suffer the symptoms of acute
endometriosis. The memoir also shows the power of early life in determining
how diseases are experienced subjectively, over time.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 26 July 2016; Accepted 3 January 2017
KEYWORDS Hilary Mantel; illness narrative; psychoanalysis; psychosomatics; phenomenology
Introduction
This is the second in a series of papers devoted to the body in lifewriting. Taking
as my example Hilary Mantel’s memoir, Giving Up the Ghost (2003), I want to
demonstrate how the relatively underused discipline of psychoanalytic psycho-
somaticsmight help scholars of life writing to understand the role of the body in
the development of selfhood.1 The paper is part of a long-termproject on illness
narrative which seeks to explore how far illness memoirs (or autosomatogra-
phies, to use G. Thomas Couser’s much better term) by highly skilled writers
might help us to understand what the experience of embodiment feels like,
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from the inside, in theWest today.2Growingup involves learning to copewith a
wide range of bodily discomforts, even for healthy people. Such discomforts are
part and parcel of what we might call psychosomatic normality. The point that
literary autobiography illustrates so well is that bodily discomforts are never
merely bodily just as psychological ones are never only mental. Both are com-
pounds of the mental and the physical. Adapting to the rhythms of one’s psy-
chosomatic reality is a productive process that enables the self to develop, not
just the body; but this fact often escapes the attention of the healthy and the
able-bodied because, as the physician-writer Eric Cassell so memorably put
it, health is, among other things, ‘a mode of omnipotence’.3 I am particularly
interested in autobiographies that lay bare the contribution that adapting to
psychosomatic normality makes to selfhood. Life writing offers a valuable
window onto the lived experience of psychosomatic normality and its
vicissitudes.
To date, the most important significant large-scale theoretical attempt to
take account of the physical sources of selfhood is that of Paul John Eakin.4
Taking his bearings from the work of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio,
Eakin is interested in the ways in which autobiographical memories survive
as feeling-states to be elaborated in new contexts. Eakin’s implicit target
was the poststructuralist claim that there is no necessary relationship
between past and present selves. I want to broaden out Eakin’s model by con-
sidering the self as a psychophysical entity in relationship with other psycho-
physical entities. To fulfil this aim, I will appeal to concepts in psychoanalytic
psychosomatics.
Psychoanalytic psychosomatics studies the effects of relational experiences
on mind and body alike.5 In Mantel’s memoir, this relational dimension is
especially prominent. She sets endometriosis and the devastating effect it
has had on her life in the context of her exceptionally difficult childhood. I
will suggest that her bodily experiences were shot through with primitive,
often unconscious, perceptions of the relationships within her family of
origin; whenever she discovered new things about those relationships, she
found she had to register the change through her body in some way. She
periodically defended herself from her mind by switching off from her
body and from other people’s bodies, especially her mother’s (e.g. not noticing
her mother was pregnant). These oscillations took place in the context of her
growing acceptance of her female gender identity. There was, moreover, a
special category of psychological experience which she connected with the
supernatural; this changed her relationship with her body and which
seemed to reinforce its tendency to debility. I will argue that supernatural
experience was modelled on perceptions of her parents’ and step-parent’s
relations with one another.
There is no unified psychoanalytic theory of what Winnicott memorably
called the ‘psychosomatic partnership’.6 Consequently, the psychoanalytic
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ideas I shall draw upon come from an eclectic set of sources. I will appeal to
Kristeva’s distinction between the semiotic somatic body and the symbolic
somatic body but will add a Kleinian rider to it by insisting on the role of
identification as a bulwark against the depredations of the semiotic.7 This is
very marked in Giving Up the Ghost. I will also appeal to the idea of the
shared body schema, first sketched out in detail by Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
some version of which must underpin any version of psychoanalysis that
sees the projection and introjection of bodily states as the most basic activity
subtending all human life (i.e. all British variants). I will contend that the
hardest struggle Mantel faced in early childhood was seeing her family of
origin through her mother’s eyes. An intelligent, perceptive, imaginative
child, who loved the rest of her family deeply, could only have been disturbed
by what she saw. Developing a hypothesis by André Green concerning soma-
tisation in general, I will suggest that a factor that could have led Mantel to live
out so much of her psychic life through her body was she did not feel able to
communicate her deepest experiences of family life to her parents or step-
father. Internal and external reality were poorly differentiated in her case,
because of the reign of secrecy that governed family life.
The theories I shall advance will be set forth as plainly as I can, with only
minimal recourse to psychoanalytic language, and they are intended as specu-
lations only. For the avoidance of misunderstanding may I stress that in using
the term ‘psychosomatics’ I disclaim any suggestion that Mantel’s endome-
triosis was in any sense caused by her sufferings as a child; but I do think
childhood determined how she experienced the onset and development of
that disease.
I have tried to frame these speculations in the light of contemporary bio-
medical research too. I worked for many years as a researcher in epidemiol-
ogy. Mantel’s memoir contains a great deal of richly contextualised
psychosocial material that illustrates and amplifies the findings of epidemio-
logical studies on the long-term impact of early life stress.8 I highlight this
aspect of her work because I think it is conceivable that in the future books
like Mantel’s could come to play a more active role in medical research as gen-
erators and illustrators of hypotheses about the causes of illness and indeed of
health. The interplay at the level of lived experience between the psychological
and the physical is a primary focus for anthropologists of psychiatry such as
Joan and Arthur Kleinman and Andrew J. Strathern and for theorists of nar-
rative-based medicine; but it has received scant attention from literary scho-
lars, even though literary autobiography is potentially an important source of
information about that relationship.9
In the first part of this essay, I will describe the nature of Mantel’s mind–
body interactions in early childhood, covering what she describes as the hap-
piest part of her life, when she and her parents lived in her grandparents’
house. Young Hilary was especially fond of her grandfather, who doted on
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her.10 Strikingly, she believed she would turn into a boy on her fourth birthday
or not long afterwards. In the second part I will consider the events that
occurred following a holiday to Blackpool. It was then that she realised that
her mother and father were unhappily married. This perception coincided
with, and perhaps precipitated, a weakening of her hopes of turning into a
boy. She became sickly. When she was six, the family moved to a new
house, on a street named Brosscroft, not far from her grandparents’ home.
Fairly quickly her mother installed her lover, Jack Mantel, in the new
house. Mantel’s real father went on living in the house for around five
years. During this period of intense domestic strife, Hilary was constantly
ill with colics, pains, and fevers. The local GP nicknamed her ‘Little Miss
Neverwell’. When she was seven, she had an experience in which she believed
she could sense the presence of a supernatural creature, as high as a child of
two, the embodiment of ‘some formless, borderless evil, that came to try to
make me despair’ (p. 107). As a result of this experience, she was ‘never the
same… I was always doomy afterwards’. She became ‘a graceless being, aban-
doned’ (p. 109). She passed the 11-plus exam in 1963 and the family, minus
her father, moved to Cheshire. She never saw her father again. She attended an
academically ambitious Catholic school in Cheshire, where she won the
respect of the headmistress, Sister Mary Francis, ‘Top Nun’.11 The last
section will consider the events surrounding her voluntary admission as a psy-
chiatric inpatient for symptoms that included mysterious pains throughout
her body which were thought to be hysterical at the time but which were
almost certainly caused by endometriosis.
Embodied symbolic knowledge
Julia Kristeva famously made a distinction between the semiotic somatic body,
that is, the body which feels as though it can be acted upon by the world, and
which takes the form of an awareness of sensation, and the symbolic somatic
body, that is, the body through which a person acts upon the world so that she
and it can be experienced as meaningful. The symbolic somatic body arises
out of our growing confidence that brute somatic experience can be contem-
plated from a variety of viewpoints. The more we are able to withstand our
bodily experience, the easier it becomes to dwell upon, play with, and recon-
figure. For this reason, the semiotic somatic body is always on the way to
becoming symbolic. Now, obviously, the extension of the semiotic into the
symbolic realm is one of the signal achievements of infancy. In the sixth
chapter of Révolution du langage poétique (1974), which contains her most
extended discussion of the somatic and the symbolic, Kristeva relates the sym-
bolic body to the child’s emergence into Lacan’s symbolic order. She says that
the child who learns to speak is faced with ‘a dramatic confrontation between
positing-separating-identifying and the semiotic chora [the body as we
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experience it from birth until the mirror stage which, according to Lacan,
occurs when the child is aged between six and eighteen months]’.12 The
semiotic body continues to exist in defiance of the symbolic as the repository
of the pre-symbolic. Kristeva says that the differences between these two dis-
tinct states of the mind–body are especially significant in early childhood,
when the symbolic body rises up out of the foundations of the somatic
body for the first time.
Kristeva’s distinction captures something central to Hilary Mantel’s
account of the pains of her childhood experience. Giving Up the Ghost is
full of moments in which young Hilary submits to a bodily experience that
threatens to overwhelm her. Sometimes it does overwhelm her and sometimes
she manages to tolerate it and to sense its vast symbolic potential. I think that
in the passages dealing with her childhood, Mantel is centrally preoccupied
with the point at which the semiotic body metamorphoses into the symbolic
body, or fails to do so, and that these experiences retained exemplary signifi-
cance for her when she became ill. Here is an example of a successfully
managed experience of this kind:
Evelyn’s house – the Aldous’s house – is darker than ours and has a more dum-
pling smell. Not being Catholics, they don’t have a piano, but as they are at the
end of the common yard, they have a more tidy and well-arranged plot, with
flower beds. Outside our house my granddad has grubbed out a bed for nastur-
tiums, and trained them up a wall. He calls them storshions…When I try to
put names to their imperial colours, to the scarlet and striated amber, my
chest seems dangerously to swell… (p. 43)
But just as often the proto-symbolic character of her experience is a source of
tremendous anxiety to young Hilary. Near the beginning of the Giving Up the
Ghost, Mantel talks of the ‘overwhelming sensory power’ of her early mem-
ories: ‘my early world was synaesthesic’, she writes, ‘and I am haunted by
the ghosts of my own sense impressions, which re-emerge when I try to
write, and shiver between the lines’ (pp. 24, 23). She recalls the pain of learn-
ing to walk from her grandmother’s house to the house next door, owned and
inhabited by her great-aunt, Annie Connor. There is a raised bluish stone and
‘perhaps because it is the colour of a bruise, I will fall and howl’ (p. 29). To
reach her destination, young Hilary had to pass a rusty iron ring: ‘Grandad
says it is where they tied the monkey up but I don’t think they ever really
had one; all the same, he lurks in my mind, a small grey monkey with
piteous eyes and a long active tail’ (p. 28). When she masters the journey,
she compares the sound of the piano in the house next door with the
sound of her grandmother’s piano. The piano in her great-aunt’s house
makes a ‘bronchial, damaged’ sound. Whenever it is played, young Hilary
stands next to it ‘and feels the instrument resonating like a cat purring’ (p.
29). The purring in turn reminds her of a cat belonging to Mrs Clayton, a
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neighbour whose husband had recently died. Mrs Clayton was so distressed
by her bereavement that she had to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital.
The climactic memory in this sequence occurs when young Hilary sits on
the stairs eating a marzipan sweet and wonders if she has swallowed a
house-ﬂy which can only mean that she will die soon. ‘There is another possi-
bility, which I turn and examine in my brain: perhaps the tickling in my throat
is the sweet itself… The fear of death turns slowly in my chest cavity, like a
stewpot lazily bubbling’. ‘After a while’, Mantel writes,
I am walking about in the room again. My resolve to die completely alone has
faltered. I suppose it will take an hour or so, or I might live till evening. My head
is still hanging. What’s the matter? I am asked. I don’t feel I can say. My original
intention was not to raise the alarm; also, I feel there is shame in such a death. I
would rather just fall over, and that’s about it. I feel queasy now. Something is
tugging at my attention. Perhaps it is a sense of absurdity. The dry rasping in
my throat persists, but now I don’t know if it is the original obstruction lodged
there, or the memory of it, the imprint, which is not going to fade from my
breathing flesh. For many years the word ‘marzipan’ affects me with its
deathly hiss, the buzz in its syllables, a sepulchral fizz. (p. 33)
The bluish ﬂagstone does not merely foretell a fall; it is the same as a fall and
the accompanying sense of physical pain. The absent monkey who has to be
borne in mind stands for something worse than a fall. The child’s mind
cannot compass what might have happened to this creature. The bronchial-
sounding piano and the cat’s purring are frightening because they lead to
Mrs Clayton’s grief which again is beyond her ken. The episode with the
sweet that might be a ﬂy involves an oscillation between the semiotic and a
catastrophic version of the symbolic.
In her classic article on symbolism, Hanna Segal suggests that symbols
should always be thought of as a ‘three-term relation, i.e. a relation between
the thing symbolized, the thing functioning as a symbol, and a person for
whom the one represents the other’.13 Young children use symbols as a
means of throwing off anxiety. In the examples just given, the monkey, the
piano and the cat symbolise mental pain (and possibly death itself) and in
so doing serve to distance young Hilary from the reality of those things.
But the things symbolised remain a penumbral presence. It is not uncommon
for young children to be overwhelmed by symbolic significance: to find that
the symbol makes the thing symbolised more alive. The marzipan sweet
that turns into a fly and back into a sweet again is an example. It is more threa-
tening than the ‘storshions’ because it brings forward a meaning that is atte-
nuated in the other activities. I am suggesting that the mark of a successful
symbol is that it lends itself to sublimation. The sweet is a better symbol of
death than the fly because it pushes the idea of death further away.
One of the peculiarities of Mantel’s early childhood was the frequency with
which her body was required to bear witness to meanings that she was not
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intended to understand. A beautifully described example takes place in
Mantel’s grandmother’s house after the trip to Blackpool on which she regis-
tered her parents’ unhappiness. Her parents were playing chess.
A noise rips open the air. My parents raise their heads. It is a motorcycle, unsi-
lenced, tearing open the afternoon, snarling down the street: 60 miles an hour.
It rattles the windows: it is loud enough to wake babies, to frighten dogs. Then
in an instant it has passed us, the noise is fading to a snarl; changing and dying
in no time at all, to a long and melancholy drone, to a sigh. No one has spoken.
But we have heard. Someone clears their throat: not me. They shift in their
chairs. Their heads droop again. The racket, the roar, lasted for seconds, but
the inner ear replays it and cannot help: winding away, with an afternote like
vapour on the breeze, down the long and winding road.
I think I shall remember this. I shall remember this for ever; this dying note, the
slanting light, their bent heads. It is a moment of pure self-consciousness,
the foretaste of what is to come. I know, besides, that they are not looking at
the chessboard; they are looking, covertly, at each other’s faces. (pp. 58–9)
It is the sublimation of the symbolic meaning of the motorcycle that is most
impressive here. The tearing apart of the afternoon heralds the sundering of
the parents’ marriage and the roar of the motorcycle arouses a moment of
shared recognition even as it drowns it out. As children, we cannot know
which parts of our lives are destined to develop and which parts are not.
While retaining a great deal of her own privacy Mantel manages to evoke
in her readers what psychoanalysts call ‘memories in feeling’ – events
whose emotional tone we can recall without always having a clear idea of
their content.14 She also manages to bring to life with particular delicacy
the impact of not knowing certain speciﬁc things. Few if any children aged
three or four understand their bodies or their parents’ relationship or the
other relationships that structure their home life. Mantel’s achievement, I
think, is to give the reader an idea of what her inability to see these things
straight felt like. Coleridge (with Wordsworth in mind, of course) once
deﬁned genius as ‘the carrying on of the freshness and feelings of childhood
into the powers of manhood’.15 By that yardstick, the early parts of Giving Up
the Ghost are very ingenious indeed. Particularly impressive to me is the sus-
tained rendering of the unthinkable weighing on the little girl’s mind in the
form of physical experiences.
Early identifications
Young Hilary seems to have found the thought of femininity to be unthink-
able. Mantel does not tell her reader why she wanted to become a boy. All of
the games remembered in the early part of the memoir involved imagining
herself as male: a knight-errant or a priest. The person she seems to have
most identified with during this period of her childhood was her grandfather.
TEXTUAL PRACTICE 7
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
ing
's 
Co
lle
ge
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 08
:41
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
17
 
She notes that her grandfather had to be ‘knight and commander’ to all the
women in the extended family. ‘His possessions are a billycan, a notebook
and pencil, his guard’s hat and his guard’s lamp. It is my ambition to be a
railway guard’ (p. 35). Her grandfather seems to have encouraged this identi-
fication, telling his granddaughter that he was unwilling to send her to nursery
as she was too useful to him about the house.
Now identifications take us squarely into the realm of Kristeva’s category of
the symbolic somatic body because they require the subject to experience her
own agency. I want to suggest, however, that in addition to the love of her
grandfather, Mantel’s early identifications were driven by a need to keep
certain aspects of her home life out of focus. More specifically, Mantel used
her symbolic body as a buffer between herself and the world of adult
unhappiness.
Young Hilary was aware that her parents were very dissatisfied. They could
not afford a home of their own, they could not get social housing because of
anti-Catholic discrimination, and her in mother in particular seems to have
been frustrated with her life.
Thwarted, unhappy, she stayed in the mill and earned, she said, a wage as good
as a man’s. The work was hard and took a painful toll on immature muscle and
bone. It would be many years before the effects showed; then, with energy to
spare, she danced and sang through her evenings, in amateur shows and pan-
tomimes. Cinderella was her favourite part. Her favourite scene: the Trans-
formation. She asked herself, could she really be the child of her parents? (p. 50)
In later years, the mother complained to her daughter about her parents’
‘narrow and unimaginative’ nature (p. 49). They had not allowed her to go
to the grammar school where she would have thrived or entered her for a scho-
larship examination. They did not understand her wish to go to art college.
In one of the drafts of Giving Up the Ghost that appeared in the London
Review of Books but which was not included in the book, Mantel describes
the day she first met her stepfather, Jack, when she was four years old. She
had gone with her mother to the primary school where her mother worked
in order to borrow a typewriter. On the way home, Hilary turned around
and noticed her mother walking with a man. After they go home, her
mother says to everyone, ‘guess who I saw, Jack Mantel, Jack Mantel’.
It is an appealing tale, the tale of guess-who-I-met. Yet no one stays or lingers.
No one pauses in their everyday routine, which includes running in and out of
each other’s houses every few minutes. There seems, in general, to be a stony
response to my mother’s news. I met Jack Mantel, Jack Mantel, she says. Her
head is thrown back, her hair rippling to her shoulders, her voice trilling
with laughter. She stands with one pretty calf advanced, one foot rocking in
her high-heeled shoe. Guess who I met? No one answers. Her voice rises
high and hangs itself on one of the vacant cuphooks on the shelves above
my grandmother’s kitchen table.16
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If this extract is authoritative, then Mantel’s mother’s relationship with Jack
may have begun earlier than is apparent in the book. The memoir is more
oblique. Mantel remarks that she lived in an environment where ‘The true
nature of things was frequently hidden. No one would say plainly what was
what: not if they could help it’ (p. 46). It is tempting to conjecture that in
addition to the difﬁculties between her parents, there were also difﬁculties
between her mother and her grandparents. These tensions, which simmered
invisibly while the family lived in the grandparents’ house, quickly boiled over
once they moved to Brosscroft.
The notion that she was fundamentally male also seems to have shielded
young Hilary from knowing how unhappy her parents were. The link is
first made when her parents take her for a holiday to Blackpool:
Standing on the pier at Blackpool, I look down at the inky waves swirling.
Again, the noise of nature, deeply conversational, too quick to catch; again
the rushing movement, blue, deep, and far below. I look up at my mother
and father. They are standing close together, talking over my head. A
thought comes to me, so swift and strange it feels like the first thought that I
have ever had. It strikes with piercing intensity, like a needle in the eye. The
thought is this: that I stop them being happy. I, me and only me. That my
father will throw me down the rocks, down into the sea. That perhaps he
will not do it, but some impulse in his heart thinks he ought. For what am I,
but a disposable, replaceable child, and without me, they would have a
chance in life. (p. 52)
I view this scene in terms of Hilary’s projective identiﬁcation with her father:
unconsciously, Hilary believed he saw her as the known-but-unknown Jack,
and that he felt murderously angry with her as a consequence. But perhaps
more important is the irruption of the semiotic body into the symbolic body.
The next thing I am in bed with a fever raging. My lungs are full to bursting.
The water boils, frets, spumes. I am limp in the power of the current that
tugs beneath the waves. To open my eyes I have to force off my eyelids the
weight of water. I am trying to die and I am trying to live. I open my eyes
and I see my mother looking down at me. She is sitting swiveled towards
me, her anxious face peering down. She has made a fence of Mrs Scott’s
dining chairs, their backs to my bed, and behind this barrier she sits, watching
me. Her wrists, crossed, rest on the backs of the chairs; her lady’s hands droop.
For a minute or two I swim up from under the water clawing… I feel myself
taken by the current, tugged away. I am changed now. Not in that fever but
in one of the series, one of those that follow it, my weight of hair is cut off.
What remains is like feathers, I think, like fluff. I lose my baby fat. For
another twenty-five years I will be frail. (pp. 52–54)
The symbolic body was a male body. When her parents’ misery forced itself
upon her on Blackpool pier, her symbolic body was shattered and she was left
with a semiotic body, acting upon her against her will. Her fantasy that she
would turn into a boy lost a large share of its purpose, though that was not
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apparent to her at ﬁrst. It seems clear that Hilary’s early difﬁculties with fem-
ininity were not based on denigration of the female body. Some of the most
extraordinary passages of Giving Up the Ghost describe how overpowered
she was by her mother’s beauty. They were, I suggest, rooted in a reluctance
to consider the relationships in her family from her mother’s point of view.
She was aware that she needed her mother and she suspected her mother
wanted to abandon her. She saw how opposed her grandparents were to
her mother’s wishes generally. And, once Jack was on the scene, she had to
confront her mother’s hostility to her father and vice versa. If being a boy
afforded her a measure of protection from these realities, why would she
not seize it?
The conclusion of the scene is remarkable because it appears to hold out
the promise of a reconstitution of a new symbolic body.
For a minute or two, I swim up from under the water: clawing. I think, how
beautiful she [my mother] is. Her face frames a question. It is never spoken.
My mother has brought her own bedlinen, from home, and below my hot
cheek, chafing it, is a butterfly: spreading luxurious wings, embroidered on
the pillow case by my mother’s own hand. I see it, recognise it, put out my
hot fingers to fumble at its edges. If I am with this butterfly, I am not lost
but found. But I can’t stay. I am too hot, too sick. I feel myself taken by the
current, tugged away. (p. 53)
This primary instance of illness is fundamental. Blackpool supplies the sym-
bolic language for every subsequent collapse in the memoir.17 It also describes
a kind of ‘arc’ of her imperfect recoveries from each subsequent episode of
illness: the irruption of the semiotic body into the symbolic, followed by
the precarious establishment of a new symbolic body based on identiﬁcation
with a different member of her family.
The shared female body schema
The embroidered butterfly is a symbol of her own female body and it is the
occasion for one of the rare moments dealing with childhood in which
Hilary appears to value her own femininity. In a previous paper, I suggested
that one of the distinguishing marks of memoirs involving illness is the fre-
quencywithwhich thewriter discovers unconscious somaticmemories. In par-
ticular, the sick person finds that he or she shared a body schema with a person
or persons who are important to them. Strikingly, we are just as likely to share a
body schema with someone of the opposite sex as with someone of our own.
This phenomenon has been studied by scholars in a wide variety of scientific
and non-scientific fields. Vittorio Gallese, one of the discoverers of mirror
neurons in macaque monkeys, has proposed that whenever humans look at
someone performing an action, our motor system becomes active as if we our-
selves were executing the action in question.18 A recent number of Behavioural
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and Brain Sciences was devoted to the theme of ‘Second-Person Neuroscience’
in support of this hypothesis.19 Gallese and his colleagues acknowledge the
impact of research into infant development which infants as young as six
hours appear to have a capacity to imitate those around them. Daniel
N. Stern and Giannis Kugiumutzakis have described experiments in which a
grown-up sticks out her tongue or opens her mouth at an infant and the
infant does the same thing back.20 We know it is not a reflex because infants
do not always do it; but they do it a great deal. The baby has to translate the
experience of seeing someone into a proprioceptive impression which forms
the basis of their imitation. They do not look at their own tongues or hands
or whatever it is they are using to imitate the grown-up. They just do it.
Seeing others’ actions give us a template for action. We do not consciously
copy them; rather we discover that we have copied them through feeling and
action. This is the most rudimentary form of intersubjectivity and it is
rooted in intercorporeality. Philosophically, the father of these views is
Husserl who emphasised that our capacity to share experiences with others
turns on a process by which we simulate their experiences in our own
bodies. Merleau-Ponty developed this claim by suggesting that at some level
we are obliged to fuse our experience with that of other people.
In perceiving the other, my body and his are coupled, resulting in a sort of
action which pairs them [action à deux]. This conduct which I am able only
to see, I live somehow from a distance. I make it mine; I recover [reprendre]
it or comprehend it. Reciprocally I know that the gestures I make myself can
be the objects of another’s intention. It is this transfer of my intentions to
the other’s body and of his intentions to my own, my alienation of the other
and his alienation of me, that makes possible the perception of others.21
I think this theory or one like it implicitly underpins Melanie Klein’s idea of
projective identiﬁcation for this last assumes that we can have, and at some
level believe we do have, the same bodily experiences as other people, and
that they can have and do have ours.22 The only additional claim I wish to
make is that some shared body schemas become part of our long-term experi-
ences of embodied selfhood and radically shape our sense of who we are. This
can be seen very clearly in memoirs dealing with life-changing illness.
Now it is plain from the early parts of Giving Up the Ghost that if Hilary felt
her body was coupled with anyone else’s, it was her grandfather’s. Under his
tutelage, she could move about in the world endowed with his power. Even the
meals they ate seemed to confirm their connection in her mind:
Grandad and I have special food, at different times from other people. When he
comes off his shift he eats alone, tripe, rabbit, distinctive food that is for men.
Around noon each day I take a lamb chop, and a slice of bread and butter. (p. 45)
The illnesses she suffered post-Blackpool entailed losing his body as a happy
source of representation for her own. She continued to play boyish games
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though increasingly these now felt like play to her. If Merleau-Ponty’s account
of the developmental signiﬁcance of the shared body scheme is correct, it
would have been impossible for Hilary to be at ease with her female body
without an admired authoritative female ﬁgure near at hand whose bodily
experience offered an attractive pattern for her own. The problem was that
few things made Hilary more anxious than her mother’s body and its
capacities. And yet precisely because her mother was such a source of
anxiety she could not but dominate her daughter’s mind.
Hilary had to come to terms with being female in a context in which she felt
extremely unwell. The illnesses described are well documented in the medical
literature on childhood stress.23 Stress compromises the immune function,
especially in early life. Fevers are commonplace, the result of an excessively
active immune system. The normal cycle of hair growth ceases, leading to
temporary hair loss (the phenomenon known as ‘telogen effluvium’). And
the pains and fatigue mentioned could easily have been caused by excess cor-
tisol in the body. The GP who nicknamed Hilary ‘Little Miss Neverwell’
appears to have been ignorant of the physiology of stress. But perhaps he
was struck by the intense mutual involvement of mother and daughter
during illness. Hilary feared her mother’s waywardness very much.
Through illness, the mother appears to have identified with the daughter.
Maybe it was a way of bestowing on her daughter the care of which she
had felt deprived. At any rate the sick body was perhaps the first version of
the shared female body schema.
Hilary’s emerging sense of her body as female appears to have turned on
two related intuitions: that it was less substantial than the male body and
more prone to illness. Arguably the most disturbing feature of her life after
Blackpool was the degree to which illness and femininity became constitutive
of one another.
I am only playing, inside the Indians tepee, and I know it. I have lost the war-
rior’s body I had before fever. My bullet-like presence, my solidity, has van-
ished. Ambiguity has thinned my bones, made me light and washed me out,
made me speechless and made me blonde. I realise – and carry the dull knowl-
edge inside me – that I am never going to be a boy now. I don’t exactly know
why. I sense that things have slid too far, from some ideal starting point. (p. 57)
A body made thin and translucent by illness was implicitly female. Here, for
instance, is her description of her life at the moment when her parents quar-
relled over Jack moving in.
This is the worst time of my life: days of despair. I am on the pier at Blackpool,
with the screaming gulls and the wind, looking down into the boiling sea.
Words swirl over my head, words of loathing and contempt. A great hand
lifts me; it is the hand of the law. And here is my punishment, coming now,
coming now; I feel the rush of air against my face. The law picks me up into
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the wind, the law lets me go; I fall through space, and on the rocks my head
smashes open like an egg. The sea drinks my yellow blood. (pp. 84–5)
When she was actually in Blackpool her worry was about being disposed of,
violently. Now the focus is on her body disgorging its sickly sounding contents
(yellow blood). From this point on, the memoir has a great deal to say about
internal bodily spaces. The Maudsley psychoanalyst Henri Rey thought that
the consciousness of internal bodily spaces was the deﬁning feature of the
sense of femininity.24 It is striking how often Mantel refers to the insides of
her body in her account of her life in Brosscroft.
The memoir is quite brilliant on how these conflicts about her own body
took shape around her relationship with her mother. As relations with the
rest of the family worsened, Hilary oscillated between identifying with her
mother and cutting off from her. Identification took four main forms: (1) ima-
ginative play in which she directly imitated her mother25; (2) a deepening
sense of herself as the child of parents who did not understand her
(echoing her mother’s experience of her parents); (3) unconscious projective
identification with her mother’s hidden life26; and (4) as she moved into ado-
lescence, a desire to vindicate her mother’s thwarted academic ambitions. She
also tried, with some success, to switch off from her body. She became a feared
playground fighter at school (‘[my body] has no capabilities and no capacities,
except to be in the way, to be where it’s not wanted’). She cut off from her
senses and again, as if to confirm Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the use of a
shared body schema, the point of cutting off from her senses was to blunt
her sense of her mother’s body. For a time, she could not hear what her
mother said to her, forgot the colour of her mother’s hair, and failed to
notice when her mother was pregnant (p. 65).
The final acceptance of femininity seems to have been occurred for Hilary
in the climactic episode of the chapter entitled ‘The Secret Garden’. Shortly
before her First Communion, Hilary ‘carried a simple space for God inside
me: a jagged space surrounded by light, a waiting space cut out of my solar
plexus’. This space was invaded by the vision of the evil spirit which seems
to have come to her not so much through her eyes as through her heaving
stomach and her sense of touch:
My eyes are drawn to a spot beyond the yard, beyond its gate, a spot in the long
garden… I can’t see anything, not exactly see: except the faintest movement, a
ripple, a disturbance of the air. I can sense a spiral, a lazy buzzing swirl, like flies;
but it is not flies. There is nothing to see. There is nothing to smell. There is
nothing to hear. But its motion, its insolent shift, makes my stomach heave. I
can sense – at the periphery, the limit of all my senses – the dimensions of
the creature. It is as high as a child of two. Its depth is a foot, fifteen inches.
The air stirs around it, invisibly. I am cold, and rinsed by nausea. I cannot
move. I am shaking; as if pinned to the moment, I cannot wrench my gaze
away. I am looking at a space occupied by nothing…Within the space of a
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thought, it is inside me, and has set up a sick resonance within my bones and in
all the cavities of my body. (pp. 106–7)
After this vision, she was ‘never the same… I was always doomy afterwards’.
She became ‘a graceless being, abandoned’ (p. 109).
I want to make two suggestions about this scene. First, this encounter with
a supernatural being was based on a fantasy of impregnation by, and with, a
creature the height of a child of two. At the time this scene took place, the
older of her two brothers, Ian, was two years old.27 The scene is thus funda-
mentally one in which Hilary identifies with her mother’s body. It is about the
psychological cost of protecting her mother from knowing how disturbed she
(Hilary) had been by what her mother did to her family. More specifically, the
intensely curious part of the little girl avoids communicating to her mother
how damaging she finds adult sexuality by projecting all her own hatred
(and the hatred she believes her mother’s sexuality contains) into her
sibling. She is relating to her mother but the line of contact is distorted by
the projection that turns her sibling into an evil spirit. If on Blackpool Pier
she learned that no amount of thinking she was a boy could remedy her
parents’ unhappiness, in the Secret Garden, she intuited that being female
meant having a body that is either vulnerable to requisition by others (men,
babies, supernatural entities) or that can draw others into its own vortex
and that this peculiarity is based on their having distinctive internal bodily
space.28 Again, the result of this intuition is the destruction of her (female)
symbolic body as a source of happy representation. It is, perhaps, the
moment in which the permanence of her link with her mother’s body
became apparent to Hilary. It is as if, from this point, Hilary stopped expect-
ing to feel well. As a result of this vision, she writes, she was ‘never the same
… I was always doomy afterwards’. Elsewhere, Mantel has written movingly
about the impact of chronic pain on her personality and intellect, beginning
in childhood.29
My second observation is more speculative and I will explain it fully only in
the next part of this essay. The religious terms in which she perceived her
plight may have come from her Catholic grandmother. The tainted version
of herself she was left with involved an identification with her grandmother’s
image of her mother. Yet again, we find identification being used as a bulwark
against the complete destruction of her symbolic body but it is a double
identification with mother and grandmother, offering no clear resolution,
not unlike her ‘trying to die and trying to live’ in Mrs Scott’s boarding house.
Perhaps I might make a general point about the meaning of the superna-
tural in Giving Up the Ghost. Many commentators have drawn attention to
Mantel’s metaphoric use of the word ‘ghost’ in the memoir. She talks about
the ‘ghosts’ of the children she never had and of the boy she never became
as negative existences that continue to define her. This version of ghostliness
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will offend no one. In what is perhaps the best discussion of the topic, Alan
Radley suggests that ‘Mantel’s ghosts are misunderstood if they are interpreted
either as objects or as hallucinations. They are key mediators of the work that is
her story’.30 Although I heartily concur with him on the last point, every reader
ofGiving Up the Ghost has to confront the fact that Mantel gives us ghosts in an
objective, hallucinatory form and it is these which are most troublesome
(including for this writer). I think that ghosts that caused havoc in Brosscroft
enabled the little girl to register a point of view that dominated family life
but which was seldom openly proclaimed. This point of view had to do with
the passions and apprehensions generated by the adults’ unusual living arrange-
ments. Believing in ghosts was a way of registering those passions without
having to allude to them directly. This can be seen in the passage in which
the word ghosts first makes its appearance in family life:
The dogs, who are no longer puppies, squeal with fear in the night. My mother
comes down to them, shivering in her nightdress, and sees their hackles raised,
their thin forms shrinking against the dawn light. One night, I hear my mother
and Jack, discussing. I am lurking in the cold Glass Place, coming in from the
lavatory. ‘Well,’ she says, coming in from the lavatory. ‘Well,’ she says, ‘so? So
what do you think it is?’Her voice rises, in an equal blend of challenge, fear and
scorn. Ghosts?’ She has spoken my thoughts: which I thought were unspeakable.
The hairs rise on the back of my neck. (pp. 95–6)
In an important interview with Eileen J. Pollard for this journal, Mantel
remarked that she believes in ghosts ‘for practical purposes’.31 The ‘practical
purposes’ in question were about getting hold of the emotional currents all
around her and making as much sense of them as she could, without betraying
their overwhelming power. It was almost inevitable that it should be bound up
with sexuality.
Endometriosis
In 1970, Mantel won a place to read Law at the London School of Economics
but transferred to Sheffield the following year, to be near her boyfriend and
future husband. There she reported ‘a pain which I could not explain; it
seemed to wander about my body, nibbling here, stabbing there, flitting
every time I tried to put my finger on it’ (p. 149). Many years later she estab-
lished that these pains were almost certainly caused by endometriosis, a notor-
iously difficult condition to diagnose, especially in 1970, but as her doctors
could find no physical cause for them at the time, they concluded that they
were probably psychogenic. Her GP put her on tricyclic antidepressants;
her pains continued. She was then sent to see a psychiatrist, Dr G. Dr G
thought she was a hysteric. He said her ailments stemmed from the fact
that she was a law student. The law, he told her, was too intellectually
demanding a subject for a woman, especially one as conscientious as
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Mantel. He advised her to give up her studies and to get a job in a dress shop,
like her mother (p. 170). (Her mother was in fact a fashion buyer for a major
department store in Manchester.) Dr G prescribed Valium; but instead of
tranquillising her, Mantel found that the drug made her furious: she
wanted to burn down buildings. She admitted herself into the care of a psy-
chiatric unit as a voluntary patient, to reduce the likelihood of committing
arson. Dr G thought she was sliding rapidly into psychosis and he put her
on antipsychotics to which she had an akathisic, psychotic, adverse reaction.
It took several weeks for her doctors to see that her psychosis was iatrogenic.
She resolved to endure her pains and to steer clear of psychiatrists forever. Her
endometriosis worsened until she diagnosed it herself some eight years later
by which time it was too late to save her womb.
Many of the first reviews of Giving Up the Ghost presented this episode as
the most significant event in the whole memoir. ‘The more I said that I had a
physical illness, the more they said I had a mental illness’ (p. 171) became the
most quoted sentence from the book. Mantel’s account of those terrible days is
masterly. But I suspect a further reason why endometriosis came to dominate
the reviews was that readers felt competent to judge what had actually gone
wrong on that occasion in a way that they did not when considering the
events in the Secret Garden or on Blackpool Pier. The injustice with which
Mantel was treated by her psychiatrist allowed them to disown the much
more elliptical and diffuse aspects of Mantel’s narrative. It has to be conceded
that at certain points in the memoir, Mantel seems to encourage this
approach. She suggests, for instance, that the pains she complained of as a
girl were early pathognomonic signs of what would develop into endometrio-
sis (p. 187). The memoir exhibits a strange and surprising openness to biome-
dical explanation from this point on. But, as Sara L. Knox has rightly pointed
out, nowhere does Mantel recant the supernatural account of her infirmities
offered in the previous chapter.32
The idea that Mantel had a concurrent psychiatric condition was not far-
fetched. She concedes as much herself. ‘I was labouring under a violent sense
of injustice that may have seemed unreasonable to the people around me; I
was angry, tearful and despairing, and I still had pains in my legs’ (p. 170).
There was, moreover, an important relational context surrounding the
onset of Mantel’s pains which, so far as I am aware, was not picked up by
any of the reviewers. In 1972, Mantel decided to get married. Jack and her
mother disapproved of her marriage and refused to sign her grant forms in
protest. The mysterious pain, which she could not explain, occurred only
after the rupture with Jack and her mother. Mantel appears to have experi-
enced her undiagnosed illness as a repetition of some of the most traumatic
aspects of her sufferings as a child. At the most basic level, endometriosis
revived and amplified the colics and cramps and fevers that afflicted her
from the age of five until she was well into her teens (p. 134). Its onset
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coincided with a collapse in her relationship with her mother and Jack, just as
the non-specific illnesses of her childhood began when the conflicts between
her mother and the rest of the family broke out into the open. Dr G’s response
to her pains invited comparison with that of the GP who called her Little Miss
Neverwell. It was bad enough that he was unwilling to explore a physical
origin for her complaint. In claiming that her pains were hysterical – that
they had been caused by a refusal to take her mother as her model and to
put herself in what he plainly saw as a male gender role (that of a lawyer) –
he was ignoring the highly charged meanings that male and female roles
had had for Mantel throughout her childhood.
The relational context also matters because it shaped Mantel’s experience
of her pains. It can be seen to inflect all the symptoms Mantel attributes to
psychiatric medications. Consider this description of her response to Valium.
Valium, however, did work; it worked to damage me…One day I sat by the
hearth at Roebuck Road and imagined myself starting fires – not in my own
chimney, but fires in the houses of strangers, fires in the streets. Somewhere
along the line, I seemed to have been damaged; I imagined myself doing
damage, in my turn. I knew these thoughts were not rational, but I was
obliged to entertain them; day by day I smouldered in a sullen fury, and
when I saw a carving knife I looked at it with a new interest. I agreed to the
clinic because I thought that, if I were to act on my impulses, someone
would see me and stop me – before, at least, it got to arson and stabbing,
and the deaths of strangers who had never harmed me at all. (p. 172)
Two of Mantel’s female relatives had died in ﬁres: her paternal grandmother
(who, signiﬁcantly given the conﬂict generated by Mantel’s marriage, called
off her wedding because she saw a ghost), and a relative of her mother, ‘a
little girl called Olive who burned to death when her nightdress caught
alight’ (p. 26). Perhaps Mantel’s wish to start ﬁres was a way of expressing
her feeling that, like Olive and her grandmother, she was being consigned
to her family’s damaged past. In Mantel’s ﬁrst two novels, Muriel Axon, a
character Mantel has said she based on herself, stabs herself with a pair of scis-
sors and sets ﬁre to the house she grew up in, which is full of ghosts (the house
is plainly modelled on Brosscroft).33
Many critics have commented eloquently on Mantel’s first attempt to write
herself back to health during her stay on the psychiatric ward.34 This took the
form of a short story. Here is how she explained it to Dr G.
Andwhat was it about? Awomanwho believes her baby has been taken away and
a substitute provided in its place. I see, said Dr G, and where and when did this
occur? In rural Wales, I said, funnily enough. (I’d never been to Wales.) I don’t
have to say the date but it feels like the early 192os. I mean judging by their fur-
niture and clothes. Does it? said Dr G. It’s a time well before social insurance,
anyway, I said. The doctor won’t come up the mountain to see them because
they can’t pay. I see, said Dr G. And how does it end? Oh, badly. (pp. 173–4)
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Thenext timeMantel sawDrG, he forbade her towrite. Butwhat arewe tomake
of this story? I suggest it is an attempt to see hermother fromher grandmother’s
point of view. Mantel’s mother was born in December 1926, a little after ‘the
early 1920s’ but close enough.35We know too that she saw herself as a changel-
ing: ‘Cinderella was her favourite part. Her favourite scene: the Transformation.
She asked herself, could she really be the child of her parents? Or some changel-
ing princess, dropped into Bankbottom by accident?’ (p. 50). TheWelsh setting
too is signiﬁcant. Mantel recalls that when she was growing up,
All my behaviour seemed to anger [Jack], just by the fact of being behaviour… I
felt as if I were a survival, a relic, a small squat subject race, whose aboriginal
culture was derided; like the Welsh, for example, a nation for whom Jack
had no time at all. (pp. 143–4)
Wales here is surely a metaphor for Mantel’s grandparents’ household. From
Jack’s standpoint, it was a contemptible, aboriginal place.
Mantel has said that the story she wrote during her psychiatric admission
supplied the nucleus of her first two published novels, Every Day is Mother’s
Day (1985) and Vacant Possession (1986). It is striking though that those
novels are about three generations. In Every Day is Mother’s Day, Muriel
Axon, a ‘mildly retarded’ young woman kills her child, whom her mother
says is a changeling, to prevent her mother from taking it away from
her. The reason no doctor comes to see her during her pregnancy is that
her mother will not allow it. Her mother wants to control the pregnancy
herself. Her chief rival is the state as represented by the local authority’s
department of Social Services. (Muriel Axon goes on to kill her mother.)
When Mantel first presented at the Student Health Centre, she and her
doctors wondered if she was pregnant. Throughout the chapter dealing
with her endometriosis, there are hints that an important but unacknow-
ledged function of psychiatry and gynaecology is to demonstrate that the
female body and everything it is capable of can be controlled by over-
whelming force. Changelings represent the ultimate proof of this state of
affairs: a mother whose child is taken away from her is deprived of the crea-
tivity of her own body. In an interview given in 1997, Mantel commented
that
It’s a strange thing to say, considering that Muriel is a mentally defective mur-
deress, but I really think that Muriel is me in that relationship, who can only
cope by closing her eyes, closing her ears and… I think that if I go back to
my childhood, probably the relationship between myself and my mother was
negotiated very badly… it was a very long and painful process for me to see
what that book was about. And once I got to the end of Every Day is
Mother’s Day Muriel had in effect murdered a child to stop it being taken by
her mother…Muriel has never gained a sense of her own personality, she
has no self, because her mother has not allowed her to have a self.36
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Perhaps some similar deprivation was the chief cause of Mantel’s anger when
she was a young woman.
In a lengthy critique of the Paris School of Psychosomatics, the late André
Green argued that some people are compelled to live out their conflicts
through their bodies because of excessive mentalisation (the Paris School
focused on cases of insufficient mentalisation).37 Such people are often
required by parents to deny reality. Green suggested that this leads to a
shrinkage of the preconscious mind, the mind they can go back to, to turn
things over at their own pace. The distinction between internal and external
reality is harder to maintain as a result. It seems to me unquestionable that
Mantel was forced to live out a great deal of her emotional life through her
body and that, because of the reign of secrecy at home concerning her
parents’ living arrangements, she was required to deny reality both in the
home and outside it, more or less constantly. Green says it is impossible to
understand psychosomatic structures without recourse to the concept of
‘negative hallucination’ (denial of reality). Mantel’s tragedy is that the psycho-
somatic structure of her early home life robbed her of a standard of normality
to apply to her pains. The pain she was left with long after leaving the psychia-
tric ward became the heir to countless childhood bafflements. It reached back
to the childhood growing pains that her GP thought were psychosomatic; to
the collapse of her family relationships at the age of seven (never to be dis-
cussed in public at all or in private very much); and in the psychiatric
phase of her illness career, to the neurotic fears she found so real in early
childhood. Her physicians’ denial that she had a physical illness can only
have resonated with her early experience of having to be silent about her
home life, a reticence that covered over so much loss for her.
In a fine essay on chronic pain and autobiography, Leigh Gilmore observes
that ‘pain shapes the relationships we have to our bodies and with others’.38
Giving Up the Ghost, which Gilmore singles out for special praise, illustrates
this point with peculiar virtuosity. If we survey Mantel’s illness career up to
her first hospital admission, we find that pain occupies the place previously
taken by confidence about how matters stood within her family of origin.
Pain is a means of retaining some of the status quo ante, albeit on worse
terms. Of course, once she diagnosed the cause of her pains, she was able
to separate them from her family life. But she did not always choose to do
so. Early in the memoir, she describes visits that she and her husband used
to make to her mother and Jack in Norfolk in the early 1990s. Jack, we are
told, had recently had a coronary bypass. ‘Routinely, as we left’, Mantel
writes, ‘there was a small ache behind my ribs’ (p. 18). Pain it seems still
retained an object-relational significance.
Her physicians’ failure to diagnose the cause meant she had to carry it
around the same way she carried around the memory of the evil spirit and
the fizzing of the fly on the staircase: as a frightening somatic experience,
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expanding into something psychologically vast. So ingrained is this way of
dealing with the vicissitudes of life that medical language has almost no pur-
chase over it. Mantel cannot say that it isn’t her stepfather’s ghost she sees in
her house in Norfolk because migraine auras were something she learned
about long after her psychosomatic habits had been settled. She has to
credit ghosts with a modicum of reality because ghosts are part of her own
habitual mode of dialogue with herself, a mode that took shape in early child-
hood. Without them, she would not be who she is.
Medicine today finds itself in a peculiar position. Evidence from studies in
epigenetics, epidemiology and infant research points to the power of child-
hood psychological experience in determining adult health. At the same
time, medicine as it is practiced in hospitals, though officially wedded to a
form of mind–body monism, in practice assigns little significance to mental
functioning, which is always reduced to biology. Without denying the
successes of biomedicine, books like Mantel’s show why interiority is so
important. Interiority, understood diachronically and from a developmental
point of view, plays a powerful role in shaping illness experience and can
also decisively affect the course of a disease process. I ended my previous
paper by suggesting that first-person memoirs offer theorists of life writing
and others the opportunity to challenge the anti-mental bias of modern
biomedicine by reclaiming the whole experiential field in which illness
occurs in the West today. I hope I have demonstrated that Mantel’s
memoir makes a vital contribution to that task.
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